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Shocks to Product Networks and Post-Earnings Announcement Drift 
 
 
 
Abstract: This paper examines whether shocks to less visible product market network peers 
explains industry level post-earnings announcement drift (IPEAD). On the real-side, we find that 
peer earnings shocks propagate slowly through the network, creating a complex and conditional 
autocorrelation structure in earnings shocks. This impacts the financial-side, and IPEAD arises 
only when shocked peers are less visible in the network and when shocks are driven by persistent 
supply-side shocks to expenses, and not by demand-side shocks to sales. IPEAD is particularly 
strong when 10-K expense disclosures are opaque. Collectively, our results suggest that inattention 
to less visible peers, complex autocorrelation in earnings shocks, and a poor informational 
environment on the expense side are likely channels that generate IPEAD. IPEAD returns are 
economically large in subsamples motivated by this explanation.  
 
 
JEL classification: G14; L22; M41  
Keywords: Product market, Networks, Persistence, Inattention, Supply shocks, Post-earnings 
announcement drift 
Data Availability: All data are publicly available from sources identified in the text. 
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1. Introduction 
The existing literature has documented industry-level price drift following earnings 
announcement (i.e., industry level post-earnings announcement drift, henceforth IPEAD) using 
traditional and highly visible industry classifications (Ayers and Freeman 1996; Hui et al. 2013; 
Hui et al. 2016). While these studies demonstrate that industry earnings shocks impact a focal 
firm’s future earnings growth and stock returns, little is known about the channels that drive the 
results. It is particularly puzzling that security prices underreact to these publicly observable 
shocks, and moreover, that industry-wide returns (IPEAD) are more persistent than the firm-
specific returns (regular PEAD) (Ayers and Freeman 1996). We fill this void in the literature by 
advancing a new explanation for IPEAD based on both the visibility of industry shocks specifically 
on the supply-side of the firm, and the opacity of disclosures explaining the firm’s cost structure.  
We propose that a highly granular intransitive network model of IPEAD can shed new light 
on the phenomenon, its propagation through the network, and its underlying sources. We 
hypothesize and find that IPEAD stock returns only propagate slowly through the network when 
peers are less visible.  Shocks otherwise propagate quickly and predictable stock returns do not 
arise. Our results are strongest in regions of the network where disclosure is less informative, and 
earnings shocks are specifically driven by changes on the expense-side (supply-side) of the firm 
and not on the revenue-side (demand-side). This suggests that although opaque expense 
disclosures might be optimal to maintain proprietary information about production, this strategy 
also has potential side effects in the form of inefficient stock prices, which can distort a firm’s cost 
of capital. We thus provide a new explanation of prior research on intra-industry information 
transfers and IPEAD by illustrating the role of inattention to less visible peers and elevating the 
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importance of supply shocks specifically to expenses, particularly when they are less salient to 
investors than are demand shocks. 
     Prior studies have identified industry peers based on the Standard Industry Classification 
(SICS), North American Industry Classification (NAICS), and Global Industry classification 
(GICS).1 Unlike standard industry classifications, which are transitive and vary little over time 
(Hoberg and Phillips 2010; Lee et al. 2015), dynamic and time varying intransitive networks 
enable us to examine more precisely how shocks propagate through both near and distant peers, 
and when propagation is slow or fast. Moreover, the specific network we consider partially 
overlaps with the aforementioned traditional industry classifications. This allows us to further 
distinguish earnings propagation through peer relationships that are more visible to investors 
from those that are less visible using strong comparisons. We are thus able to directly test 
whether inattention to shocks and opaque disclosures are  likely channels generating the slow 
adjustment in the stock market.  
We investigate the impact of peer shocks on a focal firm’s earnings growth and stock prices 
using an important corporate event: earnings announcements. Our joint analysis of visibility and 
product market distance is made possible through recent advance in textual analysis - the Text 
Based Industry Classification (TNIC) from Hoberg and Phillips (2010, 2016)2. TNIC is a new 
industry classification that defines industry peers as firms that use common vocabulary in the 
business description of their 10-K. We use TNIC to first examine how real-side earnings shocks 
transmit through industry networks. We then examine whether stock market investors efficiently 
price the impact of peer earnings shocks on a focal firm’s earnings surprise. 
                                                 
1 We use SIC codes to classify traditional industry peers. We also perform additional analyses later in the 
paper to confirm that our inferences do not change when we use GICS or NAICS codes.  
2 See Appendix B for further information explaining TNIC measures. The TNIC data is from the Hoberg 
and Phillips digital library at www.marshall.usc.edu/industrydata.  
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To ensure that our findings are fully distinct from existing studies that focus on traditional 
industry classifications, and to further examine the impact of near versus distant peers, we 
decompose a focal firm’s earnings surprise into five orthogonal components: two based on 
traditional industry (SIC) codes, two based on TNIC industries, and a residual firm-specific 
component. Because these components are highly correlated in their raw form, we rotate the five 
components to be orthogonal using a Cholesky decomposition. We find that this adjustment is 
crucial to separately identify the components of earnings surprises uniquely due to each set of SIC 
versus TNIC peers, and proximate versus distant peers.  
    We report several interesting findings. First, on the real-side, we document that economic 
shocks travel through the network of industry peers with delay, and peer earnings surprises 
strongly influence a given focal firm’s earnings surprise, but with more delay for more distant 
peers. Specifically, when we divide industry peers into those more closely related to the focal 
firm and those more distant in each industry network, we find that “close peers” have more 
persistent and immediate impact on the focal firm.3 However, more remote peers continue to 
influence the focal firm earnings with longer delay, suggesting that earnings shocks propagate 
through the peer network slowly over time. This finding is novel, and shows that network 
propagation on the real side generates a complex, slow moving, and conditional autocorrelation 
structure in earnings shocks.  Especially in the presence of inattention and opaque disclosure, it 
is natural to propose that such network behavior can explain the delayed stock market response 
to industry earnings shocks (IPEAD).  
                                                 
3 We consider firms sharing the same three-digit SIC or TNIC3 code as “close peers” to the focal firm 
(TNIC3; SIC3). Similarly, we identify peer firms sharing the same two-digit SIC or TNIC2 code but not 
the same three-digit SIC or TNIC3 code as “remote peers” (TNIC2⊥3; SIC2⊥3). 
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Regarding the financial-side, we thus examine whether stock market investors fully 
internalize this slow propagation of peer earnings shocks on the real side. We first confirm the 
presence of both own-firm PEAD and IPEAD in our sample, as documented in the existing 
literature. We then find that IPEAD arising from less visible TNIC network peers is significantly 
longer lasting and stronger in magnitude than what has been documented in prior research using 
highly visible traditional peers. Furthermore, TNIC peers subsume the explanatory power of the 
traditional peers when predicting stock returns.  We conclude that no IPEAD underreaction arises 
in highly visible parts of the peer network once we control for shocks to the less visible nodes in 
the network.   
We further extend the literature by examining the role of network distance and find that 
the earnings surprises of close peers generate economically larger and more immediate IPEAD 
than those of remote peers using the standard PEAD announcement windows. However, as we 
examine longer horizons, distant peers generate growing IPEAD that eventually dominates the 
slowly decaying signal form close peers.  Remarkably the effect of distant peers on returns is 
delayed as much as a year as the information only slowly propagates through multiple edges of the 
network.  Our stark findings on both visibility and network distance are novel and are not reported 
in existing studies.  
To further understand the mechanism through which IPEAD arises, we decompose earnings 
surprises into its income statement components. We categorize major items such as sales surprises 
as shocks to the firm’s demand-side. Others such as SG&A and COGS reflect shocks to the firm’s 
supply side. We find that although demand and supply-side shocks both contribute to earnings 
persistence on the real-side, IPEAD on the financial-side only arises following shocks to the firm’s 
supply-side expenses. We explore the micro-foundation of this novel result and find that IPEAD 
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is strongest when (A) SG&A is important (SG&A is a high fraction of sales), and (B) textual 
expense disclosures in the 10-K are more opaque. These results indicate that IPEAD has stronger 
roots in parts of the network where firms have complex and difficult to model expense dynamics 
that are also economically important drivers of a firm’s valuation. We conclude that the market 
efficiently prices demand shocks, likely because high demand for a firm’s products is very salient 
to investors. In contrast, the market is inattentive to supply shocks in regions of the network where 
firms disclose less about their expense dynamics.  
We also test a number of auxiliary predictions of our inattention hypothesis. We find that 
IPEAD is particularly large in magnitude (1) when TNIC industry peers are less jointly owned by 
mutual funds and thus are particularly exposed to inattention (see Cohen and Frazzini 2007) and 
(2) when the less visible peers are particularly similar to the focal firm and are thus more relevant. 
Overall, these results support the view that inattention to less visible peers and a poor informational 
environment surrounding supply-side shocks play a role in explaining IPEAD.  
Our key findings are robust. We repeat the analyses using GICS and NAICS codes for 
traditional industry classifications and find similar results. We also carefully control for price 
momentum and consider alternative return windows and find that our results continue to be robust.  
We contribute to the extant literature in several ways. First, our study adds to the literature 
on network peer effects by documenting network propagation in earnings on the real-side (Foster 
1981; Ayers and Freeman 1997; Pandit et al. 2011; Shroff et al. 2017). Our study is also the first 
to show that low visibility of peer links is a necessary condition for IPEAD to arise, as we find 
IPEAD only when we consider less visible regions of the peer network.4 Furthermore, we provide 
novel evidence that IPEAD is stronger when shocks are rooted in the supply-side, and particularly 
                                                 
4 Our study also extends prior research examining the benefits of identifying more informative industry 
peers (Hoberg and Phillips 2010, 2016; Lee et al. 2015). 
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in regions of the network where firm disclosures about expenses are opaque. We believe that a 
highly granular and dynamic intransitive network model of the industry peer network is crucial in 
understanding how earnings shocks propagate from one peer to another, and when the propagation 
will create IPEAD.  
Our paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we review the relevant literature and develop 
our hypotheses. In Section 3, we provide our research design and data for sample selection. Section 
4 contains our empirical results and Section 5 provides the mechanism driving the results. Section 
6 provides robustness checks. We conclude our study in Section 7. 
 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis 
2.1. Industry Earnings  
Our study is related to research on the firm-specific and industry-wide components of 
earnings and the pricing of this information. Prior research finds evidence that firm earnings and 
stock prices are affected by peer firm information. Brown and Ball (1967) show that a significant 
amount of variation in a firm’s earnings can be explained by industry-wide earnings. To offer an 
explanation for the price drift following earnings surprises called PEAD (e.g., Ball and Brown 
1968; Thomas and Bernard 1989, 1990; Livnat and Mendehall 2006)5, Ayers and Freeman (1997) 
investigate whether the industry component of earnings is incorporated in stock prices earlier than 
                                                 
5  PEAD remains robust in recent years and many studies have considered its causes (e.g., Chi and 
Shantikumar 2016). Earlier work attributes PEAD to investors’ failure to appreciate more complex time-
series properties of earnings, and a “fixation” on a random walk model with a drift (Bernard and Thomas 
1990). Alternative explanations have been advanced to explain PEAD. For instance, Sadka (2006) examines 
the influence of liquidity risk as a contributing factor to the anomaly. Ng et al. (2008) find that the initial 
underreaction and subsequent drift is stronger for firms with higher transaction costs, suggesting that market 
frictions impede price discovery by arbitrageurs.  
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the firm-specific component. They provide evidence that firm-specific information is the 
underlying cause of PEAD. However, Elgers, Porter, and Xu (2008) negate Ayers and Freeman 
(1997)’s assertion after adjusting for measurement error introduced by treating realized returns as 
unrealized returns.  
Recent studies strongly advocate that industry earnings, in part, explain PEAD. Relying 
on economic theories suggesting that industry earnings are more persistent than firm-specific 
earnings, Hui et al. (2013) show that investors’ underreaction to analysts’ forecast revisions is 
attributable to industry earnings. Relatedly, Hui et al. (2016) find that future stock prices drift in 
the direction of industry earnings and show that this drift arises from a misunderstanding of the 
persistence of industry earnings. Kovacs (2016) provides evidence that investors underreact to 
industry-wide fundamentals based on analysts’ forecasts, implying that peer firms’ earnings 
announcements are attributable to PEAD.  
Whereas these studies improve our understanding of investor reactions to industry-wide 
earnings surprises, prior research remains silent about why investors do not correctly price the 
implications of industry-wide earnings for a firm’s earnings growth. This phenomenon is puzzling 
given that industry-level information is widely available on the public domain and industry-wide 
earnings are more persistent than firm-specific earnings (Ayers and Freeman 1996). To answer 
this question, we examine whether shocks to text-based product market peers play an important 
role in the persistence of earnings shocks and whether IPEAD is driven by these less visible TNIC 
peers. We also propose a novel mechanism driving these results by examining the role of supply-
side shocks to TNIC peers and information opacity of 10K- disclosures regarding supply-side 
shocks. 
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2.2. Product Market Networks 
Firms have many economic links to other firms through various types of relationships.  
The literature provides evidence that investors use peer firm information to infer the fundamentals 
about the focal firm. In addition to earlier work on intra-industry information transfer (e.g., Foster 
1981), recent studies examine the effect of disclosures made by industry peers on real decisions of 
a focal firm (Badertscher et al. 2013), or the circumstances under which such an effect becomes 
more salient (Shroff et al. 2017). Shroff et al. (2017) show that the effect of peer disclosures 
becomes more evident when information about the focal firm is more scant, and that peer 
information is substituted for focal firm information when focal firm disclosure increases.  
Among the many types of relatedness networks, those based on the product market have 
been of particular interest in the literature. Ahern and Harford (2014) emphasize the importance 
of vertical relationships in the product market in explaining merger waves. They find that M&A 
deals propagate through peer links in the supply chain, and that the transmission of merger waves 
depends on the distance in the supply chain. The literature also documents that horizontal links or 
technological links can influence mergers and acquisitions (Harford 2005; Hoberg and Phillips 
2010; Bena and Li 2014; Sheen 2014). Whereas much past research has focused on investment 
and mergers, we focus on the ability of product market relationships to explain the propagation of 
earnings surprises on the real-side and abnormal price drift on the financial stock market-side. 
 
2.3. Hypothesis Development 
We propose that earnings surprises from text-based product market peers have strong and 
persistent implications for future earnings because TNIC identifies economically relevant peers 
that are missed in traditional industry classifications. We also consider the distance in the product 
market between firm pairs to test for network propagation in industry earnings surprises. Because 
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the economic influence of industry peers increases with relatedness within an industry boundary 
(Ahern and Harford 2014), we anticipate that earnings shocks to closely connected peers have a 
more immediate effect on the focal firm’s earnings than do earnings shocks to remotely connected 
peers. We formalize our real-side hypothesis as follows: 
 
H1: Earnings surprises of text-based product market peers will have more persistent impact 
on future earnings than traditional industry peers. Additionally, more closely connected 
peers will have stronger and more immediate impact on the focal firm’s earnings. 
 
 
To the extent that the stock market does not efficiently price information from less visible 
firms (e.g., Hirshleifer and Teoh 2003), we expect stronger price drift following shocks to TNIC 
product market peers relative to traditional industry peers. TNIC industries were first introduced 
to the literature near the end of our sample by Hoberg and Philips (2010, 2016). Moreover, they 
were not published in any material distributed widely to investors as was the case for traditional 
SIC industries. Hence TNIC links were subjected to less attention by investors during our sample 
period (Hoberg and Phillips 2017). In contrast, SIC industry links are widely used and reported to 
investment professionals and academics since 1937. As was the case for the real-side, we anticipate 
greater and more immediate financial-side stock price reactions following shocks to more relevant 
proximate peers. However, we expect that more distant peers might impact the focal firm with 
delay, as shocks take time to propagate greater distances through the peer network. 
As inattention and underreaction are unique consequences of investor decisions, our 
predictions on the financial-side differ sharply on this dimension from those on the real-side. In 
particular, our inattention hypothesis predicts that the market will fully price shocks to highly 
visible peers, but will not fully price shocks to less visible peers. Yet inattention will not materially 
affect results on the real-side, which is not influenced by the attention of stock market investors. 
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Our central financial-side prediction is that only shocks to less visible peers will influence stock 
returns:   
 
H2: Investors are more likely to underreact to earnings surprises to less visible TNIC 
product market peers than traditional industry peers. Additionally, investors are more likely 
to incorporate earnings surprises to more distant peers after significant delay.   
 
 
The aforementioned hypotheses derive from characteristics of the entire product market 
surrounding a given firm. We also consider whether specific accounting information can amplify 
these predictions. Earnings, being the last item on the income statement, can be influenced by a 
host of different shocks, each having different implications for future earnings and investor 
attention. We expect that investors will most efficiently price shocks characterized by a rich 
informational environment, and in contrast, they are less likely to impound shocks from opaque 
origins into stock prices. 
The informational environment surrounding a firm’s demand-side is likely richer than that 
surrounding its supply-side. Investors consider sales to be the most important financial data and 
thus sales information is the most frequent disclosure category in management’s guidance 
(Lansford et al. 2008). Attention to the demand-side is also a function of the appeal of the firm’s 
product offerings, which are salient as firms have strong incentives to increase product awareness 
and promote their products. In fact, investors are often buyers of these same products.  
However, it is less straightforward for investors to understand cost behavior on the supply- 
side. Firms’ production technology is often protected by trade secrets and supply-side information 
is often proprietary. It is natural that firms have strong incentives to withhold information on their 
plans and accomplishments on the supply-side due to the threat of losing competitive advantage 
(Healy and Palepu 2001; Guo et al. 2004; Koh and Reeb 2015). To the extent that competitors 
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might benefit from these disclosures and expropriate unprotected secrets, firms are more likely to 
withhold such disclosure, making the informational environment on a firm’s supply-side more 
opaque than its demand-side. We consider the following hypothesis: 
 
H3: Investors are more likely to underreact to earnings surprises that are driven by shocks 
to the firm’s cost structure on the supply-side than they are to shocks to the demand-side.  
This prediction is amplified when firms have higher costs and when their expense disclosures 
are more opaque.  
 
 
3. Research design 
3.1. Firm and Industry SUE  
Consistent with prior studies (Bernard and Thomas 1989; Ball and Bartov 1996; Sadka 
2006), we define SUE based on a seasonal random work model. As an improvement to using 
analyst forecasts as expected earnings to define SUE, the use of a seasonal random walk model 
minimizes the attrition of sample firms included in our analyses. First, we take the seasonal 
difference as a measure of unexpected earnings ( 𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑖𝑡−4 ). We then 
standardize this measure by subtracting the mean of the unexpected earnings over the past eight 
quarters, and then dividing by the standard deviation of the unexpected earnings over the past eight 
quarters.  
𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡 =
𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡−𝜇𝑖𝑡
𝜎𝑖𝑡
            (1) 
where 𝜇𝑖𝑡 is the mean of unexpected earnings from t-1 to t-8, and 𝜎𝑖𝑡 is the standard deviation 
of unexpected earnings from t-1 to t-8.  
To examine relatedness of both near and distant product market peers, we divide these 
peer firms into two categories based on their product descriptions as depicted in Figure 1 (Hoberg 
and Phillips 2010; 2016). Among the total set of possible peers, those that are most closely related 
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belong to a firm’s TNIC3 industry. These firms satisfy a roughly 2% granularity distance from the 
focal firm.6 This classification defines industry peers as all firm pairs with textual similarity in the 
highest 2% among all firm pairs in each year.  TNIC peers overlap materially but not completely 
with SIC-based peers.  Among peers are in the same SIC3 for example, 43.8% are also in the 
same TNIC3 industry. If two peers are in the same TNIC3, 49.8% are in the same SIC3. TNIC2 
includes all peers in TNIC3, and also includes the broader set of closest peers up to the broader 5% 
granularity.7 TNIC3 and TNIC2 are thus analogous to three-digit SIC codes (SIC3) and two-digit 
SIC codes (SIC2) in terms of granularity, respectively. The former captures the narrower set of 
close peers, where the latter captures a broader set of peers including more distant peers. We denote 
peer firms located within TNIC2 (“Outer circle”) but outside of TNIC3 (“Inner circle”) as 
TNIC2⊥3. These are the set of distant peers. Analogously we denote SIC2⊥3 as the set of more 
distant peers that belong to the SIC2 classification but not the SIC3 classification. To construct 
industry earnings shocks, we compute the mean value of firm-specific earnings shocks (SUEit) 
across all firms included in a given industry group and denote them as SUETNIC,t and SUESIC,t. 
When there exists only one firm in a given industry (i.e., monopolistic firms), the industry shock 
variable is set to zero.  
Due to the fact that these firm and industry components of earnings surprises are highly 
correlated, multicollinearity among these variables may confound our inferences if we use these 
variables in regressions in their raw form. To address this issue, we conduct the inverse Cholesky 
decomposition, which transforms a set of correlated variables into a set of uncorrelated variables 
(See Appendix C for details). Specifically, the inverse Cholesky decomposition converts a set of 
                                                 
6 This granularity is chosen to calibrate TNIC3 to have granularity equal to that of SIC3. See Hoberg and 
Phillips (2016) for details. 
7 This granularity calibrates TNIC2 to be as granular as SIC2. 
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K correlated variables into K uncorrelated variables, where each of the K variables has a 
corresponding unique “primitive signal” resulting from the decomposition. The decomposition is 
meant to preserve all information in the K variables, and to rotate the variables such that each 
variable’s signal is separated from the others. As expected, we observe that before the inverse 
Choleksy decomposition, raw SUE variables are indeed highly correlated (these correlations are 
as high as 0.562). In contrast, the adjusted SUE variables treated with the Cholesky adjustment are 
essentially uncorrelated.  
 
[Insert Figure 1 Here] 
 
3.2. Regression Models 
To examine earnings persistence and network propagation effects on the real-side, we 
implement the inverse Cholesky decomposition and regress ex post firm-specific SUE on the ex 
ante TNIC and SIC industry SUE components along with the ex ante firm-specific SUE component. 
The coefficients on the five independent SUE variables represent the unique persistence of firm 
and various industry earnings surprises. Although firm-specific SUE is not related to a network 
effect, we include this variable for completeness and to explicitly control for the well known 
autoregressive property of firm earnings. We predict that the persistence of less visible TNIC 
earnings surprises should be greater than those from more visible SIC industry peer earnings 
surprises. In addition, we predict that earnings surprises from close-in peers (TNIC3; SIC3) should 
be more persistent than those from remotely connected peers (TNIC2⊥3; SIC2⊥3). We specifically 
consider the following model to test our real-side hypothesis: 
𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑇𝑁𝐼𝐶3,𝑡 + 𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑇𝑁𝐼𝐶2⊥3,𝑡 + 𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑆𝐼𝐶3,𝑡 + 𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑆𝐼𝐶2⊥3,𝑡           
+ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑖,𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡,                                  (2) 
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where i and t denotes firm and year quarter, respectively. Following prior research, across all 
regressions, we include firm size and the book-to-market ratio to control for risk characteristics, 
and we cluster standard errors by firm and quarter.  
     To investigate whether investors efficiently price the implications of peer firm surprises for 
focal firm earnings growth, we test our financial-side hypothesis by replacing future SUE with the 
focal firm stock return in the regression model. In particular, we regress ex post style-adjusted 
(cumulative size and book-to-market adjusted) returns on all five SUE variables (Livnat and 
Mendenhall 2006; Chi and Shantikumar 2016).8 Firms belong to one of 25 (5x5) style portfolios 
depending on their size and book-to-market ratio each year. We compute abnormal returns by 
subtracting the value weighted portfolio returns of stocks in each bin from each firm’s raw returns. 
CAR[X,Y] denotes abnormal returns accumulated over a window from X calendar days to Y 
calendar days after the earnings announcement. We use abnormal returns accumulated over a 
quarter (CAR[2,90]) as our baseline specification consistent with the existing literature. To further 
examine the extent to which stock prices incorporate information in earnings shocks to the various 
firm and industry components, and to test for slower moving network propagation effects, we 
accumulate abnormal returns over various windows up to two years after earnings announcements. 
This is also motivated by the implication of inefficient markets that more severe underreaction 
should generate longer lived return predictability. We estimate the following model9 to examine 
the pricing of firm specific and industry earnings surprises: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑇𝑁𝐼𝐶3,𝑡 + 𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑇𝑁𝐼𝐶2⊥3,𝑡 + 𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑆𝐼𝐶3,𝑡 + 𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑆𝐼𝐶2⊥3,𝑡           
+ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                   (3) 
                                                 
8 Our results are similar when we use size-adjusted returns as our dependent variable.   
9 Including momentum, defined as monthly cumulative returns from t-13 to t-2 as an additional control on 
the financial-side does not alter our inference. 
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where i and t denotes firm and year quarter, respectively. In this regression, the coefficient on firms’ 
own SUE indicates the return drift following own firm earnings announcements. Similarly, the 
coefficients on the industry SUE terms identify the return drift following earnings shocks to 
industry peer groups.  
 
3.3. Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
Our initial sample includes firm quarters listed in the intersection of the COMPUSTAT and 
CRSP for the years 1999 to 2011. After requiring data to be present in the 10-K based TNIC 
database of product market peers, we obtain 202,488 firm quarter observations. Finally, for the 
market reaction tests, we also require non-missing return data accumulated up to four quarters after 
earnings announcements. We winsorize variables at the 1 and 99 percentiles to mitigate the effect 
of outliers.   
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the variables used in the regression tests. The 
mean values for our CAR variables are close to zero, indicating that our size and book-to-market 
adjusted returns are properly constructed for all windows.10  
 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
Table 2, Panel A provides Pearson correlations between our SUE variables after the inverse 
Cholesky decomposition is applied, and the one quarter baseline market reaction CAR[2,90].11 
Consistent with prior research (Bernard and Thomas 1989, 1990), the focal firm’s own earnings 
surprise is positively related to the ex post abnormal return. We also document that this price drift 
is positively related to TNIC industry peer shocks. In contrast, it is only weakly positively related 
                                                 
10 All our variables are defined in Appendix A.  
11 We also repeat the analysis using various windows such as CAR[2,180] and CAR[2,360] and find that 
our inferences are similar.  
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to SIC3 industry peer shocks, and negatively related to more distant SIC peers. These results 
confirm that IPEAD is strong in our sample and that it is only strongly driven by less visible text- 
based peers. TNIC industry peers’ earnings shocks thus correlate more with ex post abnormal 
returns than SIC industry peer shocks. This conclusion holds both for closely connected and 
remotely connected TNIC and SIC peers, respectively. Panel B of Table 2 shows that the 
correlation between the top line of income statements and supply side items, namely COGS and 
SG&A, is very high and significant - a fact that will be relevant later when we need to separate 
demand and supply side shocks.12   
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
 
4. Results 
4.1. Results of the Real-Side Tests 
 We test our real-side hypothesis regarding the relation between shocks to product market 
peers and a focal firm’s earnings surprises in Table 3.  
 
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
 
We find that the coefficients on SUETNIC3 are significantly positive in predicting the focal firm’s 
ex post earnings surprise. Moreover, this coefficient is substantially larger than the SUESIC3 
coefficient. However, as we predicted in our real-side hypothesis, the SUESIC3 coefficient still does 
contain residual information. This result is consistent with Hoberg and Phillips (2016), who find 
that although TNIC peers are more informative than SIC peers, both peer groups do contain some 
                                                 
12 It is noteworthy that Peters and Taylor 2017 suggest that in 90% of firms, Compustat includes R&D in 
SG&A, implying that R&D is an important determinant of SG&A.  
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significant information. These results overall suggest that earnings surprises from shocks to TNIC 
peers have a more persistent effect on the focal firm’s earnings surprises than do shocks to SIC 
industry peers. We also find similar results for remotely connected peers that reside outside a focal 
firm’s “inner circle” of rivals but reside inside the “outer circle”. It is noteworthy that SUETNIC2⊥3 
significantly predicts future earnings while such predictability is not found for SUESIC2⊥3, 
suggesting that more distant traditional SIC industry peers contain little information relevant to 
predicting a focal firm’s earnings surprises. These results further support our hypothesis (H1) 
regarding differential persistence in industry earnings surprises. Also as expected, we find that 
more closely connected industry peers have more persistence than do more remotely connected 
industry peers. In particular, the coefficients on SUETNIC3 (SUESIC3) are greater than those of 
SUETNIC2⊥3 (SUESIC2⊥3). This supports our hypothesis that product market distance also matters in 
explaining the persistence of earnings surprises.  
A final result in Table 3 is that, as we use deeper lags, the SUETNIC2⊥3 coefficient decays 
more slowly than the SUETNIC3 coefficient, consistent with slower propagation of shocks from 
more distant peers. However, we note that this is difficult to see by simply looking at the 
coefficients in Table 3, and hence we plot the decay patterns of the various coefficients in Figure 
2. Panel A of Figure 2 plots the Table 3 coefficients for various lags of SUETNIC3 and SUESIC3, 
where each coefficient is scaled by the most recent quarter’s coefficient so that the decay is 
measured relative to the largest initial value. The figure thus shows the rate of decay of the initial 
persistence level over time. For example, a value of 0.50 in the second quarter would indicate that 
half of the signal decays after two quarters. We find that although TNIC3 is substantially more 
persistent than is SIC3, both signals decay at a nearly identical rate. This remarkable finding is 
likely explained by the fact that TNIC3 and SIC3 are calibrated to have exactly the same 
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granularity, and hence we would predict a similar decay rate even though TNIC3 is more 
informative than SIC3 in terms of raw impact. 
Panel B of Figure 2 shows that the decay rate of more distant peers is slower than that of 
close-in peers. This indicates that it takes more time for earnings surprises from more distant peers 
to propagate through the network to the focal firm. For example, after three quarters, the TNIC3 
coefficient decays to 39.7% of its original value. In contrast, the more distant TNIC2⊥3 decays to 
62.8% of its original value. The latter is 60% larger than the former, indicating a very strong 
relationship between the decay rate and product market distance. We conclude that more distant 
industry shocks propagate through the network of industry peers with greater lag than do shocks 
to more close-in industry peers. 
[Insert Figure 2 Here] 
 
Taken together, the results of Table 3 and Figure 2 are consistent with the notion that 
product market peer earnings (TNIC) are more informative about own firms’ future earnings than 
traditional SIC-based industry earnings. Moreover, shocks to more distant peers have less initial 
impact, but their longer term impact on the focal firm decays more slowly over time. If investors 
are not fully aware of these nuanced stochastic properties, then these findings have important 
implications for the financial-side. 
 
4.2. Result of the Financial-Side Tests 
 To test whether our findings on the real-side mirror stock return drifts following earnings 
announcements on the financial-side, we examine the link between our ex ante firm-specific and 
industry-wide components of SUE and ex post abnormal returns. In Table 4, we estimate equation 
(3) separately for the overlapping and non-overlapping windows. In Panel A of Table 4, we first 
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confirm that the coefficient on the focal firm’s earnings surprise is positive and significant in all 
columns and that the magnitude of the coefficients increases as we measure returns over longer 
periods of time. This pattern is consistent with the notion that investors exhibit underreaction to 
earnings surprises for several quarters (PEAD). More importantly, Panel A shows that the 
coefficients on earnings surprises from TNIC peers are positive and significant. In contrast, we do 
not find significant coefficients for traditional industry peers (SIC3; SIC2⊥3), implying that 
investors fully account for the implications of the earnings surprises to more visible SIC industry 
peers. These results suggest that the price drift associated with industry shocks (IPEAD) is 
primarily driven by less visible TNIC product market peers. 
The return drift associated with closely connected product market peers illustrates that 
IPEAD is economically relevant in our sample. This impact also increases as we extend the return 
window up to a full year. In total, a firm with a one standard deviation shock to its TNIC3 peers 
experiences a stock return that is 1.8% higher in the following year. This result is economically 
large, and it understates the even larger returns available in quintile or decile portfolios.  
We next discuss the impact of more distant TNIC2⊥3 peers on IPEAD. Although shocks to 
more proximate TNIC3 peers generate IPEAD immediately in the next quarter, shocks to more 
distant peers only generate significant IPEAD over longer horizons such as one year in Panel A. 
In other words, investors’ reaction to the earnings surprises of TNIC2⊥3 peers is more lethargic 
than their reaction to the earnings surprises of more proximate peers. This finding indicates that 
shocks to more distant peers propagate through the network to the focal firm with delay. These 
propagation results are similar to those of Ahern and Harford (2014), who find network 
propagation effects for vertical mergers in the supply chain.  
 
 [Insert Table 4 Here] 
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 In Panel B of Table 4, we also examine abnormal returns defined over non-overlapping 
windows to more uniquely identify the incremental return drift attributable to each period, and to 
more rigorously illustrate the differential impact between near and proximate peers. We find 
significantly positive results on the closely connected product market peers in columns (1) and (2) 
for short horizons. These results indicate that investors delayed response to proximate peers lasts 
a full year, although the rate of return accumulation decreases with time. In the second quarter 
after the earnings announcement (column (2)), we find that the magnitude of the delayed response 
with respect to SUETNIC3 is comparable to that of firm-specific SUE, supporting the economic 
importance of this variable in explaining IPEAD.   
Panel B of Table 4 also shows that when more distant TNIC2⊥3 peers are shocked, the 
market reaction is particularly lethargic. Unlike other variables, where coefficients imply declining 
impact on returns over time, we find that the impact of these more distant peers actually increases 
over time and becomes significant in the one to two year horizon. This result is particularly 
supportive of the hypothesis that shocks to more distant peers propagate through the network to 
the focal firm with material delay. 
Overall, the evidence in Table 4 is consistent with our hypothesis (H2) that investors react 
slowly to industry earnings shocks with less visibility (i.e., inter-firm relations in the product 
market), and this significantly contributes to IPEAD. Delays are particularly long when peers are 
more distant in the product market.  
 
5. Mechanisms 
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 In this section, we examine the inattention hypothesis and mechanism in greater detail. 
Because less visible TNIC industry shocks subsume traditional SIC-based peer shocks in our 
earlier tests, the analysis in this section focuses only on TNIC peers for parsimony.  
 
5.1. Supply-Side Shocks 
We first consider the differential impact of demand and supply side shocks on earnings 
surprises. Prior research suggests that a firm’s revenue shocks (demand-side) are more persistent 
than expense surprises (supply-side) (Ertimur et al. 2003). We decompose industry earnings 
surprises into these components by first examining surprises to each item on the income statement 
that contributes to earnings. We specifically examine TNIC peer surprises to revenues (Sales), 
operating income before depreciation (OIBDP), operating income (OI), and pre-tax income (PI). 
We examine which ex ante line item surprises are associated with a focal firm’s ex post real-side 
earnings surprises and its subsequent price drift. Table 5 reports the results. We find that all line 
item surprises are significantly related to a focal firm’s earnings surprise. Consistent with prior 
research showing greater persistence of revenue shocks (Livnat 2003), we find that TNIC peer 
revenue shocks are particularly important.  
We next examine whether these ex ante line item surprises are impounded in stock prices. 
We find that these shocks do not predict IPEAD, suggesting that investors efficiently incorporate 
peer revenue shocks into stock prices. In contrast, investors do not fully price TNIC3 surprises to 
line items that are lower down on the income statement including OIBDP, OI, and PI. These results 
suggest that investor underreaction to peer earnings shocks is likely to arise from shocks to the 
supply-side, as these line items are differentiated from sales growth shocks primarily due to their 
inclusion of the firm’s expenses. The magnitude of coefficients for OIBDP, OI, and PI suggests 
that approximately 80 to 90% of total IPEAD is attributable to supply-side expense shocks. 
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[Insert Table 5 Here] 
To further explore this link to the expenses, we proceed to define supply- and demand-side 
shocks directly. We partition earnings surprises into a demand-side shock and an orthogonal 
supply-side shock and repeat the analysis reported in Table 5. We first note that raw (SG&A + 
COGS), which we define as “SupSide”, is highly correlated with raw sales with a Pearson 
correlation of 0.984. This is expected, as for instance, if sales double, the firm needs to make twice 
the goods, and hence COGS should roughly double. Note that this will occur even if there are no 
shocks to the firm's cost structure. To evaluate shocks unique to the cost structure itself, we thus 
need to identify major changes in costs that are not driven by mechanistic changes in sales. We 
thus regress total costs (COGS+SG&A) on sales and take the residual, which we name 
"ResSupSide". This identifies supply-side shocks that are uncorrelated with demand-side shocks. 
We next examine if these unique supply-side shocks can explain IPEAD.  
We report the results in Table 6. As shown in Panel A of Table 6, we first find that both ex 
ante demand and supply shock components are significantly related to a focal firm’s future 
earnings surprises on the real-side. Consistent with our findings in Table 5, we also find that the 
coefficient on DemSideTNIC3 is greater than that of ResSupSideTNIC3. This implies that unexpected 
demand shocks are more important than unexpected supply shocks in predicting a firm’s future 
real-side earnings surprises. However, although they are weaker than demand-side shocks, we still 
find that ResSupSideTNIC3 is highly persistent in its unique ex post impact on the focal firm. Hence, 
to be efficient, the stock market would need to price the impact of both demand and supply-side 
shocks on a focal firm, as both materially predict the focal firm’s future earnings.  
We thus test whether the market efficiently prices both demand and supply shocks and 
examine abnormal returns over various windows. As reported in Panel B, Table 6. We find that 
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IPEAD arises from the supply-side shocks. Specifically, we find that the coefficient on 
ResSupSideTNIC3 is positive and significant whereas the coefficient on DemSideTNIC3 is 
insignificant. This evidence suggests that mispricing relating to IPEAD is driven by supply shocks 
to TNIC peers.  
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
 
5.2. Inattention 
Consistent with our investor inattention hypothesis, we have shown that less visible TNIC 
peers generate IPEAD whereas more visible SIC peers do not. We examine if our strong results 
on the supply-side, but not the demand-side, might also be driven by investors’ inattention. It likely 
that investors pay more attention to the demand for a firm’s products to extrapolate sales growth 
because a firm’s future sales and its growth would be a key determinant of firm valuation. By 
contrast, they might be less informed about cost structures such as marketing expenses and R&D 
expenses given that firms have incentives to limit disclosure of information about cost structures 
due to competitive threats.  
 To provide corroborating evidence about the mechanism driving IPEAD, we first examine 
how quickly stock turnover adjusts around supply-side and demand-side shocks. Figure 3 plots the 
difference in scaled turnover for firms that receive large positive shocks relative to those that 
receive large negative shocks (we separately display supply-side and demand-side shocks). Scaled 
stock turnover is the natural log of monthly turnover (share volume traded/shares outstanding) 
scaled by average stock turnover from months t-13 to t-2.   
Figure 3 shows that turnover increases earlier and more efficiently around demand-side 
shocks relative to supply-side shocks. For example, 65% of the total increase in turnover has 
already occurred by the month zero (the month of the shock) for demand shocks. This is about 
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52.5% for supply-side shocks. More important, 22% is already realized three months before the 
shock for demand-side shocks, and this is only 6% for supply-side shocks. In all, these findings 
reinforce the notion that investors pay less attention to supply-side shocks and this inattention 
translates to large ex post return predictability.  
 [Insert Figure 3 Here] 
Because IPEAD should only be important for those firms with high expenses, we also expect 
that SG&A expenses and opaque expense disclosures will further amplify the delayed response to 
supply shocks. To further support the view that the investor attention drives the drift associated 
with the supply-side, we examine whether investors’ lagged reaction to supply-side news is larger 
when firms have high SG&A and when expense disclosures are opaque. In Table 7, we present the 
results. 
We first partition the sample into quintiles based on each firm’s SG&A (Selling, General 
and Administrative) to sales ratio and examine the magnitude of IPEAD for the lowest and highest 
SG&A quintiles. Panel A of Table 7 shows that the TNIC3 coefficient is positive and significant 
only in the highest quintile group. This further supports our conclusion that investors do not fully 
price information embedded in SG&A. We also partition the sample based on COGS and find that 
the coefficients are positive and significant in both the highest and the lowest quintiles. Hence our 
findings indicate that investors particularly underreact to SG&A shocks. 
To examine the role of disclosure opacity, we construct a text-based measure of expense 
disclosure opacity similar to Hanley and Hoberg (2010) and relate it to IPEAD. Specifically, we 
identify MD&A paragraphs as expense-related when they use the words “expense” or “expense”.  
We then compute the cosine similarity between each firm’s expense paragraphs and the average 
expense vocabulary across all firms in the given year. 
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The resulting measure is bounded in [0, 1], and a higher number indicates that expense 
disclosures are more opaque. Intuitively, this would indicate that the firm’s disclosure resembles 
the average disclosure across all firms, indicating excessively general or vague disclosure. Lastly, 
because we seek to identify firms that are more opaque on the supply side than on the demand 
side, we divide the text-based expense opacity measure by a similar opacity measure based on 
revenue disclosures (based on MD&A paragraphs using the words “revenue”, “revenues”, and 
“sales”). 
Panel B of Table 7 shows the results from this analysis. Using the text-based opacity 
measure, we partition the sample into quintiles in each year. We find that the coefficients on 
SUETNIC3 is larger for the most opaque quintile and the difference between the high and low quintile 
coefficients is also statistically significant at the 1% level. We find similar results in the extended 
return windows.  
To ensure the Panel A and B results are distinct, we sort our sample into two dimensions: 
SG&A and expense opacity13, and examine whether this result is most pronounced for firms with 
high SG&A and high expense opacity. As expected, we find that the coefficients on SUETNIC3 are 
larger and more significant in firms with high SG&A and high opacity scores. Results for 
SUETNIC2⊥3 mirror the results from SUETNIC3. The results reinforce the notion that our findings are 
primarily driven by investors’ delayed response to supply-side shocks, particularly when 
disclosure is opaque. 
[Insert Table 7 Here] 
 
 To further investigate the role of inattention, we consider mutual fund common ownership 
of peer firm pairs (see Cohen and Frazzini 2008). Cohen and Frazzini (2008) suggest that when 
                                                 
13 In two-way sorting, we partition into terciles to ensure a sufficient number of observations in each group.  
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many mutual funds commonly own a given pair of stocks, then it is likely that the specific 
economic link between the pair has a high level of attention. They consider this test of inattention 
specifically to vertical customer and supplier economic links. We apply this test to the horizontal 
TNIC links considered in our study.   
To implement this test, our initial unit of observation is a firm pair. For each such pair, we 
measure the intensity of mutual fund joint ownership of both stocks in each pair. We then average 
this quantity over all permutations of firm pairs in each TNIC industry peer group and thus obtain 
joint ownership metrics for each individual firm’s industry peers in each year. Industry peer groups 
with higher joint ownership are subjected to greater investor attention, and a consequence is that 
investors should be more aware of the economic links between such linked firms. We then sort 
firms into quintiles in each year based on the intensity of mutual fund joint ownership of the focal 
firm and its peer firms.  
Table 8 reports the results. We find that the market reaction to TNIC3 shocks becomes 
significant starting from the CAR[2,90] window for the lowest quintile of joint ownership. In 
contrast, we find no significant IPEAD in the highest quintile. In the longer CAR[2,180] and 
CAR[2,360] windows, we also observe that the magnitude and significance of IPEAD is strong 
and pronounced for the lowest joint ownership quintile, whereas the corresponding figure for the 
highest quintile is marginally significant at the 10% level. These results support the investor 
inattention hypothesis. We also find some evidence that investors exhibit a delayed response to 
the earnings surprises of more visible industry peers (SIC industry) in the lowest quintile. This is 
further consistent with limited attention and processing power (Hirshleifer and Teoh 2003; Cohen 
and Frazzini 2008; Menzley and Ozbas 2010). 
  
 [Insert Table 8 Here]  
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A final prediction in our framework is that two ingredients are both needed for IPEAD to 
be strong: inattention and strong economic links. Our use of TNIC peers is relevant on both 
dimensions, as existing work illustrates that TNIC links are stronger than traditional SIC links, and 
also that TNIC peers are less visible. However, we further predict that IPEAD should be even 
stronger when TNIC peers are particularly proximate (similar) to the focal firm. The relevance of 
shocks to these peers is very high, and if investors are inattentive to shocks to these peers, we 
predict more pronounced IPEAD. Using TNIC based product similarity measures from Hoberg 
and Philips (2016), we partition our sample into quintiles based on TNIC total similarity (the sum 
of text-based similarity scores between a focal firm and all of its TNIC3 peers) and then examine 
the magnitude of IPEAD in the highest and lowest quintiles.  
Table 9 reports the results. The table shows a significant delayed market response to the 
earnings surprises of TNIC3 peers in the highest total similarity quintile but we do not find any 
evidence in the lowest quintile. We also find that the return drift associated with focal firm earnings 
surprises is greater in the highest quintile than in the lowest quintile across all columns. The 
magnitude of the delayed response to the earnings surprises of TNIC3 peers is also greater than 
the earnings surprise of the focal firm itself. In other words, IPEAD is significantly greater in 
markets with higher total product similarity. Overall, the results in Table 9 indicate that shocks to 
highly proximate peers that are also less visible generate particularly strong IPEAD. 
 
 [Insert Table 9 Here] 
6. Additional Tests 
 Although Standard Industry Classification (SIC) codes have been widely used in the 
literature, we also examine whether our results are robust to alternative industry classifications 
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including Global Industry Classifications Standard (GICS) codes and North American Industry 
Classification System (NAICS) codes.   
 Table A1 in the online appendix presents results for earnings persistence using GICS 
instead of SIC codes. Consistent with our findings, we find that earnings shocks to TNIC peers 
have a larger effect on a firm’s earnings surprises than do earnings surprises to GICS industry 
peers. Table A2 reports that IPEAD drift results when TNIC is compared to GICS industry peers. 
We continue to find a large drift associated with TNIC earnings shocks. Moreover, we find no drift 
associated with GICS earnings shocks. These results indicate that IPEAD is mainly driven by 
shocks to less visible peers alone and reinforces our findings based on traditional SIC codes. We 
also consider tests based on NAICS codes. Table A3 and Table A4 show the results. We continue 
to find a significant difference in persistence between TNIC peers and NAICS peers and once 
again the drift is largely associated with less visible text-based TNIC industry peers. These tests 
provide added robustness confirming that the drift associated with industry-wide earnings news is 
driven by less visible TNIC peers.  
 We also control risk alternatively by using size-adjusted returns and including momentum 
as an additional control in the market-side regressions. Consistent with the main results, Table A5 
shows that industry-level price drift following earnings announcements occur only from the less 
visible TNIC peers and that investors needs more time to incorporate shocks to distant peers. Using 
momentum defined as accumulative stock returns from month t-12 to t-2, Table A6 reports 
qualitatively similar results. Lastly, Table A7 extend the return window used in the univariate test 
to [2,180] and [2,360]. The results closely resemble those in Panel A of Table 2. TNIC peers have 
stronger and larger correlation coefficients with the return measures, and within TNIC peers, the 
correlation of close peers is stronger than that of remote peers.  
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7. Conclusion 
 We use a dynamic network approach to examine whether shocks to less visible product 
market peers play an important role in the persistence of earnings shocks on the real-side and the 
stock market pricing of earnings shocks on the financial-side. The underlying premise of our 
analysis is that inattention to industry shocks, complexity in the autoregressive properties of 
earnings shocks, and an opaque informational environment are likely channels driving slow price 
adjustment in the stock market. 
To test our conjecture, we separately consider ex ante shocks to less visible text-based 
TNIC peers and to highly visible SIC industry peers. As expected, earnings shocks to either set of 
peers predict future focal firm earnings on the real-side. However, only less visible TNIC product 
market peers generate significant IPEAD on the financial-side. Further reinforcing these effects 
on both the real and financial-sides, we also find novel network propagation results, as ex ante 
shocks to more distant peers propagate through the peer network to a focal firm with increasing 
delay as long as one year.  These results together suggest that inattention to less visible peers is a 
necessary condition for IPEAD to become large, and complexity in the autoregressive properties 
due to heterogeneous network distances can exacerbate these effects. We further show that 
comparisons between text-based industry peers and alternative industry peers based on GICS and 
NAICS provide similar robust results.   
To gain further insight into the mechanism driving our results, we explore how shocks to 
peer sales (demand-side shocks) differentially impact our results as compared to shocks to peer 
expenses (supply-side shocks). We find that the market is particularly slow to price supply-side 
shocks to less visible peers, particularly when the level of SG&A expense is high and the firm’s 
textual 10-K expense disclosure is opaque. Additional tests suggest that investors are attentive to 
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salient demand shocks, but they are inattentive to shocks that uniquely impact a firm’s cost 
structure.  Such cost-side shocks are likely to generate less attention from investors as firms have 
strong incentives to shield information about their cost advantages from rivals.  
Finally, our results are also stronger when industry peers are less jointly owned by mutual 
funds, and when product similarity among TNIC peers is high. Collectively, we provide evidence 
suggesting that investor inattention and poor information environments surrounding supply-side 
shocks can explain why IPEAD arises. Our results also suggest that network propagation models 
have excellent potential in modeling the dynamics of earnings shocks through relatedness 
networks over time. This is particularly the case when relatedness, attention and opacity can be 
measured in a continuous way.  
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Appendix A. Variable Definition  
 
Variable Definition 
  
CAR[X,Y] = Size and book-to-market adjusted returns accumulated over a window from 
X calendar days after earnings announcements to Y calendar days after earnings 
announcements.  
SUE = Standardized unexpected earnings, defined as unexpected earnings (= 
earnings t – earnings t-4) minus the mean value of past 8 unexpected earnings 
and scaled by the standard deviation of past 8 unexpected earnings [refer to 
Bernard and Thomas 1989; Ball and Bartov 1996; Sadka 2006]. 
SUEIndustry = Average standardized earnings surprise of firms included in a given industry. 
TNIC2⊥3 and SIC2⊥3 denote firms included in TNIC2 and SIC2 but excluded 
from TNIC3 and SIC3, respectively. 
Size = The natural logarithm of market value of equity. 
BTM = Book-to-market ratio. 
Sale = Standardized unexpected sales, defined as unexpected sales (sales t – sale t-
4) minus the mean value of past 8 unexpected sales and scaled by the standard 
deviation of past unexpected sales. 
OIBDP = Standardized unexpected OIBDP (Operating Income before Depreciation), 
defined as unexpected OIBDP (OIBDP t – OIBDP t-4) minus the mean value 
of past 8 unexpected OIBDP and scaled by the standard deviation of past 
unexpected OIBDP. 
OI = Standardized unexpected OI (Operating Income), defined as unexpected OI 
(OI t – OI t-4) minus the mean value of past 8 unexpected OI and scaled by the 
standard deviation of past unexpected OI. 
PI = Standardized unexpected PI (Pre-tax Income), defined as unexpected PI (PI t 
– PI t-4) minus the mean value of past 8 unexpected PI and scaled by the 
standard deviation of past unexpected PI. 
SupSide = Standardized unexpected supply side (= COGS + SG&A), defined as 
unexpected supply side shock (supply sidet – supply sidet-4) minus the mean 
value of past 8 unexpected supply side and scaled by the standard deviation of 
past unexpected supply side shocks. 
ResSupSide = Standardized unexpected residual supply side (= the residual from regressing 
COGS+SG&A on sales), defined as unexpected residual supply side shock 
(residual supply sidet – residual supply sidet-4) minus the mean value of past 8 
unexpected residual supply side and scaled by the standard deviation of past 
unexpected residual supply side shocks. 
DemSide = Standardized demand side (= sales – ResSupSide), defined as unexpected 
demand side shock (demand sidet – demand sidet-4) minus the mean value of 
past 8 unexpected demand side and scaled by the standard deviation of past 
unexpected demand side shocks. 
EarnExp = The sum of earnings before extraordinary items and ResSupSide. 
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Common = Mutual funds’ joint ownership of peer firms in a given industry [see Cohen 
and Frazzini 2008]. 
 
Appendix A. Variable Definition (Continued) 
 
Variable Definition 
  
TNIC3TSIMM = Firm-by-firm pairwise total product market similarity based on textual 
analysis of product descriptions available from 10-K filings [refer to Hoberg 
and Philips 2016]. 
SG&A = Sales, general, and administrative expenses scaled by sales. 
Opacity Exp = Opacity for expense-side disclosures, defined as a text-based opacity measure 
based on MD&A paragraphs containing expense discussions [see Hanley and 
Hoberg 2010].  This is scaled by an analogous text-based opacity measure for 
revenue-side MD&A disclosures as our objective is to measure if the supply 
side is more opaque than the demand side. 
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Appendix B. Text-Based Network Industry Classification 
 
Hoberg and Phillips (2016) suggest measuring the extent to which firms relate to others in the 
product market, by relying on the product market descriptions available from 10-K filings. They 
determine the relation of these words and produce a relatedness or similarity score for each firm 
with all other publicly traded firms. This similarity score is a cosine similarity score that evaluates 
the similarity across documents.  
 
This industry classification considers the possibility that competition may evolve dynamically 
every year, and is thus more flexible to incorporating business or technical changes in classifying 
a group of firms as industry peers. Another feature is that it allows each firm to have its own set of 
distinct competitors. Analogously, this is similar to a social network, where individual (firms) have 
a distinct set of friends (competitors). This feature is more realistic considering the following 
example: 
 
Suppose both firm A and B consider firm C as a rival. However, firm A offers products distinct 
from what firm B offers. In this case, due to product differentiation, firm A and firm B are not in a 
competitive relationship with each other, although they have a common rival firm C. In general, 
TNIC reflects the fact that firms that have a common rival do not necessarily compete with each 
other. 
 
These features enable better identification of industry peers. Hoberg and Phillips (2010; 2017) also 
show that the use of TNIC product market industry peers instead of to SIC or NAICS generates 
economically large improvement in explaining competitions and cross-sectional firm 
characteristics.  
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Appendix C. Inverse Cholesky Transformation 
 
The Cholesky decomposition states that we can decompose a given positive-definite matrix Ʃ into 
a form that satisfies Ʃ = LLt, where L is a lower triangular matrix with positive entries on its 
diagonals (Golub and Van Loan 1996). In this paper, we rely on the properties of the Cholesky 
decomposition for two purposes: (1) to uncorrelate a set of variables, and (2) to standardize 
variables. 
 
In our model, we include a set of earnings surprises, one of which is the focal firm’s earnings, two 
of which are industry level earnings surprises in the product market (one for the closely connected 
and the other for the remotely connected), and the rest of which are industry level earnings 
surprises in the traditional industry classification (also one for the closely connected and the other 
for the remotely connected). As these variables are inherently correlated and overlap with each 
other, we need to orthogonalize these variables to mitigate the multicollinearity problem. Also, the 
standardization of our main variables of interest, earnings surprises, will enable a more intuitive 
interpretation of our results. 
 
We thus use the inverse Cholesky transformation, which uses the Cholesky decomposition on the 
given covariance matrix to make a linear transformation to (1) uncorrelate and (2) standardize a 
set of variables at the same time. To implement this transformation, we conduct a cross-sectional 
(instead of pooled) transformation in each year-quarter to avoid look-ahead bias. We find that, in 
each year-quarter, the off-diagonal terms of the covariance matrix become (very close to) zero and 
the diagonal terms become (very close to) one, which is indicative of a successful transformation. 
Note that, in Table 1, the various SUE variables have nearly identical variance. They are not 
exactly equal to one due to the fact that we use cross-sectional transformations in each period. 
 
Golub and Van Loan (1996) provide more detailed statistical background and proofs related to the 
Cholesky decomposition, and Wicklin (2010, 2013) provide the implementation of the inverse 
Cholesky decomposition in SAS.  
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Figure 1. Inter-Firm Relations in the Product Market  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 shows an example of a product market space with different granularity. The focal firm at the center 
has closely linked product market industry peers (TNIC3) in the inner circle, and also remotely linked 
product market industry peers (TNIC2⊥3) outside the inner circle but inside the outer circle.  
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Figure 2. Decay Rate (Duration) of Earnings Surprise Propagation 
 
Panel A. TNIC3 vs. SIC3 
 
Panel B. TNIC3 vs. TNIC2⊥3 
 
 
Figure 2 depicts the decay rate of past SUE’s ability to predict current earnings. A slow decay rate would indicate information propagating through the peer network 
more slowly. The data points in the above figures are from Table 3 and are equal to each quarter’s coefficient for each SUE variable divided by the coefficient from 
the most recent quarter t+1. The decay rate is then indicated by the slope of the regression line (displayed on each graph) running through the four points. A steeper 
slope indicates more rapid decay. Panel A reports the decay rate using the SUETNIC3 coefficients (TNIC3: solid line) and the SUESIC3 coefficients (SIC3: dotted line). 
Panel B compares closely connected peers SUETNIC3 (TNIC3: solid line) and remotely connected peers SUETNIC2⊥3 (TNIC2⊥3: dotted line). 
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Figure 3. Stock Turnover Test 
 
 
 
Figure 3 plots monthly stock turnover for the seven month window centered on month zero, the month of 
a large earnings shock. We compute monthly stock turnover as monthly trading volume divided by shares 
outstanding. For each firm, we then take the natural log of the given month’s turnover divided by the 
average ex ante average turnover from months t-13 to t-2. On the demand-side (solid line), we then sort 
stocks into quintiles based on their demand side shock in month zero, and the figure presents the average 
turnover ratio of the high quintile minus the average turnover ratio of the low quintile (rescaled to units 
where 100% indicates the ex post turnover relative to the ex ante baseline). The dotted line reports 
analogous results for high minus low residual supply side shocks.  
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable N Mean Std Dev 25th Pctl 50th Pctl 75th Pctl 
CAR[2,90] 202,488 0.002 0.303 -0.132 -0.016 0.101 
CAR[2,180] 202,488 0.001 0.469 -0.205 -0.032 0.139 
CAR[2,360] 202,488 0.003 0.741 -0.311 -0.066 0.188 
SUE 202,488 -0.024 1.010 -0.702 -0.015 0.671 
SUE TNIC3 202,488 -0.059 1.061 -0.674 -0.067 0.557 
SUE TNIC2⊥3 202,488 -0.101 1.131 -0.811 -0.128 0.607 
SUE SIC3 202,488 -0.066 1.013 -0.579 -0.066 0.454 
SUE SIC2⊥3 202,488 -0.087 1.059 -0.568 -0.095 0.430 
Size 202,488 5.754 2.075 4.243 5.695 7.147 
BTM 202,488 0.733 0.845 0.315 0.545 0.877 
Sale 200,345 0.086 1.045 -0.775 0.151 0.937 
OIBDP 176,160 0.015 1.011 -0.766 0.036 0.801 
OI 171,151 0.003 1.013 -0.782 0.023 0.793 
PI 201,996 -0.022 1.011 -0.716 -0.012 0.689 
SupSide 160,762 0.096 1.101 -0.805 0.183 0.982 
ResSupSide 160,736 0.038 1.061 -0.782 0.045 0.840 
DemSide 160,736 0.050 1.092 -0.821 0.109 0.926 
EarnExp 160,740 0.006 1.023 -0.632 0.018 0.668 
Common 189,760 0.184 0.128 0.081 0.180 0.283 
Similarity 202,488 9.472 17.728 1.306 2.378 6.643 
SG&A 165,092 1.116 95.200 0.159 0.269 0.409 
OpacityExp 187,010 1.099 0.662 0.995 1.025 1.069 
 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of variables used in our analyses. Subscript refers to the industry 
over which we take the mean of the given variable. Appendix A provides the definition of the variables in 
detail.  
41 
Table 2. Correlation Matrix 
 
Panel A. Market Reaction 
  SUE SUETNIC3 SUETNIC2⊥3 SUESIC3 SUESIC2⊥3 Size BTM 
CAR [2,90] 
 
0.046 0.027 0.015 0.004 -0.007 -0.017 0.025 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.091 0.003 <.0001 <.0001 
SUE  0.049 0.073 0.025 0.044 0.005 -0.011 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.043 <.0001 
SUETNIC3   0.172 0.056 0.104 0.002 -0.020 
  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.338 <.0001 
SUETNIC2⊥3    0.059 0.129 0.000 -0.014 
   <.0001 <.0001 0.874 <.0001 
SUESIC3     0.039 0.003 -0.006 
    <.0001 0.150 0.009 
SUESIC2⊥3      0.009 -0.028 
     0.000 <.0001 
Size       -0.345 
      <.0001 
 
Panel B. Income Statement Items 
   (2) 
COGS 
+ 
SG&A 
(3) 
Operating 
Income 
Before 
Depreciation 
(4) 
Operating 
Income 
(5) 
Pre-
Tax 
Income 
(6) 
Earnings 
(1) Revenue 0.984 0.782 0.718 0.592 0.496 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
(2) COGS + SG&A  0.679 0.609 0.513 0.423 
  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
(3) Operating Income Before 
Depreciation 
  0.978 0.747 0.657 
   <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
(4) Operating Income    0.757 0.677 
    <.0001 <.0001 
(5) Pre-Tax Income     0.959 
     <.0001 
 
Table 2 shows Pearson correlation coefficients with p-values below. Panel A shows the univariate test 
results of market reaction to earnings surprises. Panel B shows the correlation among various 
(unstandardized, not seasonally differenced) income statement items. Appendix A provides the definition 
of the variables in detail.  
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Table 3. Network Propagation Effect in Earnings through Industry Peers 
 
 SUEt+1 SUEt+2 SUEt+3 SUEt+4 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
SUE 0.349*** 0.185*** 0.039*** -0.323*** 
 (33.833) (21.137) (4.841) (-28.577) 
SUETNIC3 0.072*** 0.056*** 0.029*** 0.035*** 
 (13.315) (9.459) (4.599) (4.946) 
SUETNIC2⊥3 0.043*** 0.040*** 0.028*** 0.030*** 
 (7.156) (4.593) (3.023) (3.132) 
SUESIC3 0.045*** 0.035*** 0.018*** 0.024*** 
 (12.365) (8.136) (4.006) (4.947) 
SUESIC2⊥3 0.000 -0.007 -0.011* -0.009 
 (0.100) (-1.366) (-1.904) (-1.240) 
Size -0.009** -0.013*** -0.016*** -0.015*** 
 (-2.352) (-2.674) (-2.933) (-2.862) 
BTM -0.003 0.035*** 0.065*** 0.058*** 
 (-0.355) (4.330) (6.699) (7.826) 
Constant 0.035* 0.020 0.002 -0.002 
 (1.750) (0.805) (0.056) (-0.066) 
     
Observations 202,488 202,488 202,488 202,488 
R-squared 0.131 0.043 0.009 0.101 
Clustered by Firm,  
Year-Quarter 
Firm,  
Year-Quarter 
Firm,  
Year-Quarter 
Firm,  
Year-Quarter 
 
Table 3 reports the relationship between earnings shocks to industry peers and the focal firm’s future 
earnings surprises over time. We make a distinction between TNIC- and SIC-industry peers as well as more 
versus less granular industry peers in TNIC- and SIC-industry classification. SUE variables (both firm and 
industry) are adjusted by the inverse Cholesky decomposition to mitigate multicollinearity in regression. 
We cluster standard errors by firm and year-quarter and report t-statistics in parentheses. Appendix A 
provides the definition of the variables in detail. 
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Table 4. PEAD Regression over Various Windows 
 
Panel A. Overlapping Abnormal Returns 
 
CAR [2,90] 
(1) 
CAR [2,180] 
(2) 
CAR [2,360] 
(3) 
    
SUE 0.012*** 0.018*** 0.023*** 
 (8.061) (7.426) (7.933) 
SUETNIC3 0.006*** 0.013*** 0.018*** 
 (2.836) (3.824) (4.229) 
SUETNIC2⊥3 0.002 0.006 0.010** 
 (0.912) (1.488) (1.983) 
SUESIC3 0.001 0.002 0.002 
 (0.577) (0.989) (0.834) 
SUESSIC2⊥3 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 
 (-1.298) (-1.090) (-0.917) 
Size 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.789) (0.429) (0.477) 
BTM 0.005* 0.009* 0.019* 
 (1.803) (1.671) (1.845) 
Constant -0.011 -0.016 -0.030 
 (-0.944) (-0.912) (-1.229) 
    
Observations 202,488 202,488 202,488 
R-squared 0.004 0.005 0.004 
Clustered by 
Firm,  
Year-Quarter 
Firm,  
Year-Quarter 
Firm,  
Year-Quarter 
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Table 4. PEAD Regression over Various Windows (Continued) 
 
Panel B. Non-Overlapping Abnormal Returns 
 
CAR [2,90] 
(1) 
CAR [91,180] 
(2) 
CAR [181,360] 
(3) 
CAR [361,720] 
(4) 
     
SUE 0.012*** 0.005*** 0.007*** -0.002 
 (8.061) (3.591) (4.356) (-0.793) 
SUETNIC3 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006** 0.002 
 (2.836) (2.810) (2.218) (0.429) 
SUETNIC2⊥3 0.002 0.003 0.006 0.011** 
 (0.912) (1.046) (1.408) (2.220) 
SUESIC3 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 
 (0.577) (0.882) (0.479) (0.588) 
SUESSIC2⊥3 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.010* 
 (-1.298) (-0.616) (-0.302) (-1.908) 
Size 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 
 (0.789) (0.626) (0.290) (1.366) 
BTM 0.005* 0.004 0.008* 0.009* 
 (1.803) (1.234) (1.796) (1.791) 
Constant -0.011 -0.009 -0.011 -0.026 
 (-0.944) (-0.901) (-0.656) (-1.131) 
     
Observations 202,488 201,897 201,147 199,099 
R-squared 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.001 
Clustered by 
Firm,  
Year-Quarter 
Firm,  
Year-Quarter 
Firm,  
Year-Quarter 
Firm,  
Year-Quarter 
     
 
Table 4 shows how investors incorporate earnings shocks to industry peers over various delayed time 
windows. We use size- and book-to-market adjusted abnormal returns accumulated over specified windows 
relative to earnings announcements. SUE variables (both firm and industry) are adjusted by the inverse 
Cholesky decomposition to mitigate multicollinearity in regression. We cluster standard errors by firm and 
year-quarter and report t-statistics in parentheses. Appendix A provides the definition of the variables in 
detail. 
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Table 5. Underlying Mechanisms: Income Statement Items 
 
Panel A. Real-Side 
 SUEt+1 SUEt+2 SUEt+3 SUEt+4 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
SaleTNIC3 0.077*** 0.076*** 0.053*** 0.048*** 
 (10.080) (6.272) (3.601) (3.150) 
SaleTNIC2⊥3 0.034*** 0.042*** 0.036** 0.034* 
 (3.462) (2.764) (2.043) (1.946) 
     
OIBDPTNIC3 0.070*** 0.060*** 0.037*** 0.041*** 
 (12.068) (9.359) (4.774) (4.986) 
OIBDPTNIC2⊥3 0.042*** 0.039*** 0.029*** 0.031*** 
 (6.373) (4.410) (3.033) (3.154) 
     
OITNIC3 0.072*** 0.060*** 0.034*** 0.038*** 
 (12.547) (9.249) (4.756) (4.611) 
OITNIC2⊥3 0.042*** 0.039*** 0.026*** 0.029*** 
 (5.941) (4.127) (2.809) (3.163) 
     
PITNIC3 0.072*** 0.057*** 0.030*** 0.035*** 
 (13.853) (9.339) (4.540) (4.728) 
PITNIC2⊥3 0.043*** 0.041*** 0.028*** 0.031*** 
 (7.567) (4.827) (3.030) (3.058) 
     
SUETNIC3 0.072*** 0.056*** 0.029*** 0.035*** 
 (13.315) (9.459) (4.599) (4.946) 
SUETNIC2⊥3 0.043*** 0.040*** 0.028*** 0.030*** 
 (7.156) (4.593) (3.023) (3.132) 
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Table 5. Underlying Mechanisms: Income Statement Items (Continued) 
 
Panel B. Financial-Side 
 
CAR [2,90] 
(1) 
CAR [2,180] 
(2) 
CAR [2,360] 
(3) 
    
SaleTNIC3 0.002 0.003 0.002 
 (0.786) (0.928) (0.498) 
SaleTNIC2⊥3 -0.000 -0.002 -0.003 
 (-0.121) (-0.381) (-0.570) 
    
OIBDPTNIC3 0.005** 0.010*** 0.015*** 
 (2.183) (3.209) (3.563) 
OIBDPTNIC2⊥3 0.001 0.002 0.002 
 (0.267) (0.484) (0.482) 
    
OITNIC3 0.005** 0.010*** 0.016*** 
 (2.249) (3.226) (3.518) 
OITNIC2⊥3 0.001 0.003 0.004 
 (0.362) (0.755) (0.936) 
    
PITNIC3 0.007*** 0.013*** 0.019*** 
 (2.888) (3.977) (4.359) 
PITNIC2⊥3 0.002 0.005 0.009* 
 (0.746) (1.256) (1.749) 
    
SUETNIC3 0.006*** 0.013*** 0.018*** 
 (2.836) (3.824) (4.229) 
SUETNIC2⊥3 0.002 0.006 0.010** 
 (0.912) (1.488) (1.983) 
 
Table 5 shows the market response to various surprise variables constructed from the income statement in 
the post-earnings announcement period. We construct firm-level surprise variables using AR (8) and then 
compute industry-level variables by taking the mean value of the firm-level variable in an industry. AR (8) 
refers to (1) taking the seasonal difference as a measure of the unexpected firm-level component, then (2) 
standardizing by subtracting the mean of the unexpected firm-level component over the past eight quarters, 
and then (3) dividing the standard deviation of the unexpected firm-level component over the past eight 
quarters. For parsimony, we display TNIC-industry variables only, and do not report the firm-level surprise 
variable, SIC-industry variables, and controls. Surprise variables (both firm and industry) are adjusted by 
the inverse Cholesky decomposition to mitigate multicollinearity in regression. We cluster standard errors 
by firm and year-quarter and report t-statistics in parentheses. Appendix A provides the definition of the 
variables in detail. 
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Table 6. Underlying Mechanisms: Supply Shocks 
 
Panel A. Real-Side  
 SUEt+1 SUEt+2 SUEt+3 SUEt+4 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
SupSideTNIC3 0.075*** 0.070*** 0.047*** 0.048*** 
 (8.375) (5.009) (2.708) (2.764) 
SupSideTNIC2⊥3 0.045*** 0.053*** 0.049*** 0.050*** 
 (4.551) (3.719) (3.108) (3.241) 
     
ResSupSideTNIC3 0.053*** 0.046*** 0.026*** 0.022*** 
 (8.931) (7.681) (4.105) (3.902) 
ResSupSideTNIC2⊥3 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.025*** 0.027*** 
 (6.414) (5.019) (3.647) (3.678) 
     
DemSideTNIC3 0.075*** 0.071*** 0.051*** 0.048*** 
 (10.882) (6.587) (3.947) (3.660) 
DemSideTNIC2⊥3 0.047*** 0.050*** 0.036** 0.035*** 
 (5.361) (4.082) (2.533) (2.628) 
     
SUETNIC3 0.072*** 0.056*** 0.029*** 0.035*** 
 (13.315) (9.459) (4.599) (4.946) 
SUETNIC2⊥3 0.043*** 0.040*** 0.028*** 0.030*** 
 (7.156) (4.593) (3.023) (3.132) 
     
EarnExpTNIC3 0.058*** 0.042*** 0.022*** 0.027*** 
 (10.687) (8.095) (4.033) (5.107) 
EarnExpTNIC2⊥3 0.039*** 0.033*** 0.020** 0.024*** 
 (7.590) (4.719) (2.433) (3.149) 
 
 
 
  
48 
Table 6. Underlying Mechanisms: Supply Shocks (Continued) 
 
Panel B. Financial-Side 
 
CAR [2,90] 
(1) 
CAR [2,180] 
(2) 
CAR [2,360] 
(3) 
    
SupSideTNIC3 0.001 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.222) (0.244) (-0.337) 
SupSideTNIC2⊥3 -0.001 -0.002 -0.007 
 (-0.181) (-0.470) (-1.096) 
    
ResSupSideTNIC3 0.006*** 0.012*** 0.019*** 
 (2.765) (3.997) (4.273) 
ResSupSideTNIC2⊥3 0.004 0.009** 0.014*** 
 (1.442) (2.319) (2.842) 
    
DemSideTNIC3 0.002 0.004 0.006 
 (0.813) (1.237) (1.279) 
DemSideTNIC2⊥3 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 
 (-0.298) (-0.380) (-0.782) 
    
SUETNIC3 0.006*** 0.013*** 0.018*** 
 (2.836) (3.824) (4.229) 
SUETNIC2⊥3 0.002 0.006 0.010** 
 (0.912) (1.488) (1.983) 
    
EarnExpTNIC3 0.002 0.003 0.004 
 (0.923) (0.880) (0.868) 
EarnExpTNIC2⊥3 0.002 0.005 0.006 
 (0.608) (0.857) (1.005) 
 
Table 6 shows the market response to residual demand and supply variables constructed from the income 
statement in the post-earnings announcement period. We construct firm-level surprise variables using AR 
(8) and then compute industry-level variables by taking the mean value of the firm-level variable in an 
industry. AR (8) refers to (1) taking the seasonal difference as a measure of the unexpected firm-level 
component, then (2) standardizing by subtracting the mean of the unexpected firm-level component over 
the past eight quarters, and then (3) dividing the standard deviation of the unexpected firm-level component 
over the past eight quarters. For parsimony, we display TNIC-industry variables only and do not report 
firm-level surprise variable, SIC-industry variables, and controls. Surprise variables (both firm and 
industry) are adjusted by the inverse Cholesky decomposition to mitigate multicollinearity in regression. 
We cluster standard errors by firm and year-quarter and report t-statistics in parentheses. Appendix A 
provides the definition of the variables in detail. 
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Table 7. Cross-sectional test: SG&A - Lowest vs. Highest Quintile  
 
Panel A. SG&A Ratio Quintiles 
 CAR[2,90] CAR[2,180] CAR[2,360] 
 Low High Low High Low High 
       
SUE 0.012*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.025*** 0.012* 0.042*** 
 (4.073) (4.381) (2.993) (4.770) (1.645) (4.696) 
SUETNIC3 0.001 0.016*** 0.002 0.033*** 0.002 0.059*** 
 (0.462) (2.739) (0.599) (3.686) (0.339) (3.733) 
SUETNIC2⊥3 -0.003 0.011 -0.002 0.027** -0.000 0.052*** 
 (-0.789) (1.643) (-0.487) (2.390) (-0.008) (2.704) 
SUESIC3 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.004 -0.000 0.014 
 (0.382) (0.452) (0.463) (0.738) (-0.057) (1.193) 
SUESIC2⊥3 -0.005*** 0.002 -0.007** 0.004 -0.012** 0.017 
 (-2.618) (0.198) (-2.218) (0.379) (-2.276) (0.979) 
Size -0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 
 (-0.271) (-0.397) (-0.789) (-0.362) (-0.736) (-0.170) 
BTM 0.005 0.015* 0.011 0.026* 0.015 0.066** 
 (0.925) (1.795) (0.899) (1.868) (0.659) (2.186) 
Constant 0.004 -0.016 0.012 -0.030 0.028 -0.055 
 (0.332) (-0.732) (0.624) (-0.903) (0.749) (-1.184) 
       
Observations 33,043 32,998 33,043 32,998 33,043 32,998 
R-squared 0.004 0.008 0.004 0.016 0.002 0.026 
Clustered by Firm,  
Year-
Quarter 
Firm,  
Year-
Quarter 
Firm,  
Year-
Quarter 
Firm, 
Year-
Quarter 
Firm,  
Year-
Quarter 
Firm, 
Year-
Quarter 
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Table 7. Cross-sectional test: SG&A - Lowest vs. Highest Quintile (Continued) 
 
Panel B. Expense Disclosure Opacity Quintiles 
 
 CAR[2,90] CAR[2,180] CAR[2,360] 
 Low High Low High Low High 
       
SUE 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.018*** 0.025*** 0.023*** 0.039*** 
 (6.969) (7.037) (6.159) (8.301) (4.498) (7.863) 
SUETNIC3 0.006** 0.013*** 0.011*** 0.027*** 0.012** 0.039*** 
 (2.347) (3.760) (2.632) (5.122) (2.481) (5.003) 
SUETNIC2⊥3 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.009 0.014* 
 (0.671) (1.367) (1.221) (1.599) (1.609) (1.857) 
SUESIC3 -0.002 0.003 -0.002 0.006 -0.002 0.010 
 (-0.915) (0.840) (-0.809) (1.271) (-0.468) (1.531) 
SUESIC2⊥3 -0.002 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
 (-1.135) (-1.328) (-1.268) (-0.903) (-0.774) (-0.584) 
Size 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.000 
 (0.522) (0.286) (0.428) (0.019) (0.858) (0.009) 
BTM 0.006 0.001 0.016 0.003 0.029* 0.015 
 (1.375) (0.286) (1.396) (0.427) (1.755) (1.252) 
Constant -0.007 -0.011 -0.017 -0.017 -0.041 -0.038 
 (-0.522) (-0.856) (-0.716) (-0.890) (-1.266) (-1.128) 
       
Observations 37,426 37,382 37,426 37,382 37,426 37,382 
R-squared 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.010 0.005 0.011 
Clustered by Firm,  
Year-
Quarter 
Firm,  
Year-
Quarter 
Firm,  
Year-
Quarter 
Firm, 
Year-
Quarter 
Firm,  
Year-
Quarter 
Firm, 
Year-
Quarter 
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Table 7. Cross-sectional test: SG&A - Lowest vs. Highest Quintile (Continued) 
 
Panel C. Two-Way Sorts by SG&A Ratio and Expense Opacity 
 
CAR[2,360], SUETNIC3 
OpacityExp 
Low Middle High 
     
SG&A 
Low 0.005 -0.000 0.009 
 (1.019) (-0.011) (1.188) 
Middle 0.005 0.018*** 0.021** 
 (0.890) (2.991) (2.142) 
High 0.039*** 0.040*** 0.065*** 
 (3.363) (3.458) (4.098) 
     
 
Table 7 shows cross-sectional tests with partitions based on the SG&A ratio (SG&A/sales) and expense 
disclosure opacity, which is computed using expense discussions in the MD&A section of the 10-K. 
In Panel A (Panel B), we partition samples into quintiles in each year based on the SG&A ratio (MD&A 
expense disclosure opacity), and run the market reaction regressions in each subsample. In Panel C, 
we consider two-way sorts into terciles in each year based on the SG&A ratio and expense disclosure 
opacity. We use size- and book-to-market adjusted abnormal returns accumulated over specified 
windows relative to earnings announcements. SUE variables (both firm and industry) are adjusted by 
the inverse Cholesky decomposition to mitigate multicollinearity in regression. We cluster standard 
errors by firm and year-quarter and report t-statistics in parentheses. Appendix A provides the definition 
of the variables in detail. 
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Table 8. Cross-sectional test: Mutual Fund Ownership - Lowest vs. Highest quintile 
 
 CAR[2,90] CAR[2,180] CAR[2,360] 
 Low High Low High Low High 
       
SUE 0.018*** 0.010*** 0.030*** 0.011*** 0.041*** 0.012** 
 (10.466) (3.772) (12.061) (2.809) (10.217) (2.163) 
SUETNIC3 0.010*** 0.002 0.017*** 0.006 0.020*** 0.008 
 (3.959) (0.597) (4.886) (1.471) (3.963) (1.429) 
SUETNIC2⊥3 0.001 0.002 0.007 0.003 0.012 0.003 
 (0.559) (0.631) (1.469) (0.562) (1.596) (0.568) 
SUESIC3 0.004 -0.001 0.008** 0.000 0.016*** -0.001 
 (1.429) (-0.529) (1.969) (0.126) (2.643) (-0.288) 
SUESIC2⊥3 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.008 -0.001 
 (-0.556) (-1.470) (-0.656) (-0.584) (-1.044) (-0.135) 
Size 0.002 -0.010** 0.003 -0.018* 0.008* -0.026* 
 (1.293) (-1.963) (1.275) (-1.943) (1.897) (-1.797) 
BTM 0.003 0.004 0.008 0.003 0.021** -0.006 
 (1.072) (0.460) (1.612) (0.230) (2.039) (-0.280) 
Constant -0.017 0.064* -0.033* 0.113* -0.073*** 0.164* 
 (-1.420) (1.745) (-1.839) (1.734) (-2.871) (1.654) 
       
Observations 38,839 37,932 38,839 37,932 38,839 37,932 
R-squared 0.006 0.004 0.009 0.004 0.008 0.003 
Clustered by Firm,  
Year-
Quarter 
Firm,  
Year-
Quarter 
Firm,  
Year-
Quarter 
Firm, 
Year-
Quarter 
Firm,  
Year-
Quarter 
Firm, 
Year-
Quarter 
       
 
Table 8 shows cross-sectional tests with partitions based on mutual funds’ joint ownership of peer 
firms in a given industry. We partition samples into quintiles each year based on the percentage of 
mutual funds’ joint holdings, and run the market reaction regressions in subsamples. We use size- and 
book-to-market adjusted abnormal returns accumulated over specified windows relative to earnings 
announcements. SUE variables (both firm and industry) are adjusted by the inverse Cholesky 
decomposition to mitigate multicollinearity in regression. We cluster standard errors by firm and year-
quarter and report t-statistics in parentheses. Appendix A provides the definition of the variables in detail. 
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Table 9. Cross-sectional test: TNIC Similarity - Lowest vs. Highest quintile 
 
 CAR[2,90] CAR[2,180] CAR[2,360] 
 Low High Low High Low High 
       
SUE 0.015*** 0.023*** 0.020*** 0.042*** 0.019*** 0.057*** 
 (7.628) (4.234) (6.678) (5.031) (4.439) (4.582) 
SUETNIC3 0.002 0.028** 0.004 0.066*** 0.006 0.091*** 
 (0.821) (2.315) (1.191) (3.583) (1.393) (2.988) 
SUETNIC2⊥3 0.002 -0.006 0.005 -0.017* 0.006 -0.021 
 (0.669) (-0.904) (1.368) (-1.847) (1.118) (-1.444) 
SUESIC3 0.000 -0.003 0.001 -0.012 -0.001 -0.012 
 (0.009) (-0.392) (0.469) (-1.178) (-0.417) (-0.831) 
SUESIC2⊥3 -0.002 -0.003 -0.007 -0.004 -0.014** -0.000 
 (-0.675) (-0.385) (-1.251) (-0.326) (-2.168) (-0.013) 
Size 0.003*** -0.001 0.006*** -0.004 0.011*** -0.007* 
 (2.623) (-0.676) (3.006) (-1.601) (2.851) (-1.853) 
BTM 0.006* -0.004 0.013* -0.017 0.026* -0.016 
 (1.665) (-0.515) (1.863) (-1.347) (1.872) (-0.845) 
Constant -0.025** 0.008 -0.050*** 0.027 -0.091*** 0.029 
 (-2.302) (0.508) (-3.093) (1.337) (-3.202) (1.063) 
       
Observations 40,521 40,481 40,521 40,481 40,521 40,481 
R-squared 0.005 0.010 0.006 0.018 0.004 0.017 
Clustered by Firm,  
Year-
Quarter 
Firm,  
Year-
Quarter 
Firm,  
Year-
Quarter 
Firm, 
Year-
Quarter 
Firm,  
Year-
Quarter 
Firm, 
Year-
Quarter 
       
 
Table 9 shows cross-sectional tests with partitions based on product market similarity. We partition 
samples into quintiles each year based on product market similarity, and run the market reaction 
regressions in subsamples. We use size- and book-to-market adjusted abnormal returns accumulated 
over specified windows relative to earnings announcements. SUE variables (both firm and industry) 
are adjusted by the inverse Cholesky decomposition to mitigate multicollinearity in regression. We 
cluster standard errors by firm and year-quarter and report t-statistics in parentheses. Appendix A 
provides the definition of the variables in detail. 
